

CENTER FOR NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Panel Discussion on the New Counterinsurgency Manual
with **LTC JOHN NAGL**, U.S. Army, and
SARAH SEWALL, Harvard University

**"The U.S. Army/Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual"**

Moderated by:

MICHELE FLOURNOY, President and Co-Founder,
Center for a New American Security

10:00 a.m.

Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Willard InterContinental Hotel
Crystal Ballroom
1401 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004

[Transcript prepared from digital recording.]

P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FLOURNOY: Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to invite you all to take your seats, please.

Good morning. My name is Michele Flournoy. I am the Co-Founder and President of the Center for a New American Security, and thank you all for coming to what is essentially a book party for two wonderful colleagues and friends, Sarah Sewall and John Nagl, honoring the publication of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual as a book that will get wide dissemination beyond the U.S. military.

I think this has only happened once before where you have a field manual that is actually published by a popular press and distributed, the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual I am told, but this is already getting lots of attention. I think something like 30,000 copies sold, 2 million downloads, I am told a copy was found in a Taliban training camp. So the adversaries are also taking great interest in the new U.S. doctrine.

As many of you all know, counterinsurgency was really sort of an orphan in the post-Vietnam period where the U.S. military really turned away from the lessons learned, best practices, et cetera, that it had learned in

very difficult conditions in Vietnam and really turned away from the mission. The entire U.S. Government turned away from the mission, with the exception special operations forces which had it in its portfolio, but for 30 years, this was really a much neglected area. So there wasn't much intellectual development. There wasn't much progress forward in terms of understanding what counterinsurgency is and how best to prosecute it.

Fast forward 30 years, we find ourselves post 9/11 in a world that has the growing global movement of violent extremists motivated by an Islamist ideology. We have a number of weak and failing states that are finding it very difficult to provide for the basic needs of their people, and you put those two together and you have the makings of small and some large interconnected insurgencies in many countries of the world.

So most people are thinking about counterinsurgency primarily in terms of Iraq, but whatever your views on the advisability of the Iraq War, the prosecution of the Iraq War, counterinsurgency transcends the Iraq War. This is a mission that is going to define many of our future experiences with regard to how and where

we use the military over the next 10 to 20 or more years.

So, if you want to get a peak at, at least one face of future warfare, I would advise you to read this tome.

We are very privileged today to have two of the principal authors of this work. This was a very unusual group effort that brought together not only interagency players, but experts from academia, experts from NGOs and the human rights community and so forth. It really has yielded I think a very insightful and enduring contribution.

We have with us Sarah Sewall who is currently director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. It is a particular privilege for me to welcome her here, as I think we met 25 years ago when we were in college, and I have been following her ever since.

She was also in the Clinton administration, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, and prior to that, she served as a senior policy advisor to Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell.

She did her undergraduate work at Harvard and her

graduate work at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, one of the most buoyant and insightful and compassionate people you will find in Cambridge or Washington.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, who is currently commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas, is essentially in charge of training the combat advisors who are going into Iraq to train the Iraqi military. He also has experience in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

He is a graduate of West Point, also another Rhodes Scholar, and prior to reading the COIN manual, you may have also read his very well-selling and well-regarded book, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife," which if you have ever tried it, it is really hard, but about his experiences and personal insights into counterinsurgency based on his study of cases from Vietnam through more recent experience.

So, with that, let me just welcome the panelists and turn it over to Sarah. They will each make some opening remarks, and then we will come back and open it up for questions.

Thank you.

DR. SEWALL: Thank you, Michele. It is a pleasure to be here. Thank you all for braving the rain, which almost prevented me from joining you. I would have been very sad about that.

As Michele said, I was not an author, but a participant in the effort to create the field manual. Carol Merrill [ph] on my left is showing the field manual.

In the introduction, I wrote that the manual was radical and sometimes -- is this off the record, or this is being --

MS. FLOURNOY: This is on the record.

DR. SEWALL: This is on the record. Then I will stick with that term.

This is a radical field manual, and in the introduction to the University of Chicago edition, I tried to describe in brief why it is so.

If you think about the elements of it that are radical and you think about how fundamentally they challenge the tenets of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, I think you can begin to understand the broader challenges that are facing the United States at the strategic level today, and that is what I want to walk through in my

introductory remarks.

If the civilian is the center of gravity, securing and protecting is the main function of military forces not destroying. If restraint in the use of military force is fundamental to the successful prosecution of the campaign, then that is, in fact, the opposite of overwhelming force. If nonmilitary capabilities are the key to success in counterinsurgency, then not only is there promising a nonkinetic means, at least in theory, but success itself is defined differently. It is, most definitively, nondecisive.

So, in those three respects, not destroying, not overwhelming, not decisive, you can see a very explicit rejection of what have been the tenets of American military thinking and indeed U.S. strategy execution over the past several decades, at least at the larger political level.

Now, I have been arguing for sometime pre 9/11 that the context for the use of force had changed dramatically and that humanitarian considerations needed to play a more primary role in thinking about the use of force, and what has happened in the context of the post-9/11 world is that we have begun to recognize the

changes in the external operating environment, and we have been confronted by our own failures that have allowed us to see things that we otherwise were rather blind to.

So I think we have now embodied in the tenets of the manual -- I will talk about its limitations in just a moment -- an ability to understand the prosecution of conflict in a very different way, and I think for those reasons, the manual is both radical and essential for us in thinking about the 21st century and the role of U.S. military power and indeed the struggle between the west and its enemies, if I can broaden it that far.

At the same time, I think there is a very uncertain future facing both the manual and the principles embodied in it because of political challenges, because of conceptual challenges, and because of institutional challenges, and I want to walk through some of those now.

First, I want to start by recognizing some of the weaknesses of the manual. Its, perhaps, greatest strength is that it doesn't profess to be the Bible. It is very self-evaluated a work in progress, and indeed, it needs further progress.

It has shaped in the popular imagination, the

construct of counterinsurgency now as an Iraq model, a very boots-heavy, large, long-term type of counterinsurgency effort, and that is not the intent per se of the field manual, but it is clear that we as the U.S. Government, the U.S. military, as a joint institution needs to unpack counterinsurgency and try to develop in a more modular form, different labels and approaches to counterinsurgency, to go from what has become the popular imagination, the Iraq model, into a light version and to think more concretely about the role of air power, to think more concretely about what you can do with fewer forces, sometimes in a special forces model, sometimes outside of that, but to also think in micro levels, to think about working with non-state actors as the counterinsurgent in some cases, to think about defined geographical areas that may not coincide with national boundaries, so to think about and flesh out the micro-COIN model, and to try to articulate more clearly where counterinsurgency differs from preventative stability operations, nation-building, because if done properly, the continuum goes around full circle, and yet the resourcing and dot-mil-PF implications are very different for the two, and the civilian role is

very different in the two.

So I think there is some further unpacking of the operational model implicit in COIN that needs to be done to help the U.S. Government organize itself better for the prosecution of the same, and that in turn will have a huge impact on how we think about the different service capabilities that one should properly bring to bear and how we think about policy-making. So it goes both down and up as you begin to unpack these models, and I would like to think that the joint doctrine process that is currently underway will do that, but as I argued in the introduction, we keep loading onto military bureaucratic processes, fundamental political decisions, and policy-making issues that properly belong in a different venue. So it would be unfair to expect too much from the joint doctrine process, but I hope it can begin unpacking COIN models.

More broadly, we need to think about whether we actually understand the modern insurgent. Many people have written about this, but I am still unconvinced about the salient differences between religion as a motivator over ideology, but I think its implications as a broader recruiting tool really need to be better understood.

Similarly, many other people have talked about the information operations aspect of counterinsurgency. That pertains both to the recruitment and the catalyst model, but also to our own ability to communicate to a wider audience about what we are trying to do when we are in a counterinsurgency mode.

Updating the principles, this follows directly on the earlier two points. This notion of a center of gravity started in the context of the target state, the host nation population, and we cleverly expanded it to realize that we had a center of gravity at home in our domestic political environment. Well, there are other centers of gravity, too. They have to do with alliances, and they have to do in some ideological or sectarian conflicts with an unconvinced part of that group that is engaged in that ideological or religious battle. So we need to rethink some of the language about, for example, center of gravity and apply it in a modern context.

Finally, and I say this with a small degree of regret, but I do think we have to remain open to the possibility that the fundamental assumptions on which counterinsurgency is premised, in some ways the U.S.

foreign policy has been premised, this notion of a progressive, liberal, ever-improving world in which there are common interests shared by all mankind. We need to stay open to the possibility that we could be fundamentally wrong about that assumption, and that needs to guide us as we track our conceptual progress and indeed our operational efforts across the globe.

Applicability of the doctrine, two quick points on that. One, as I said earlier, I think that the counterinsurgency principles really do apply across the spectrum of warfare to just about everything except for direct strike and punitive rating-type operations. I think it really is relevant.

Dave Barno and others have written about hybrid operations of the future a la Lebanon. We are just unlikely to see conventional wars as pure as we like to imagine them. I think those days are long gone, and this counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency tension which we see I think at play in Afghanistan in a very real way is also likely to haunt us in the broader context of the long war or whatever it is that we are calling it.

The second point is that I do think these

underlying principles have great merit for strategic thinking and should be applied, although not entirely substitute for the version of the grand strategy that everyone longs for, and that I understand CNAS is in the process of developing, and I am very grateful that they will be stepping into that huge vacuum, but here are my 2 cents on why I think what undergirds the Counterinsurgency Field Manual is relevant to that grand strategy.

I want to caveat this by noting at the outset that there are enduring conventional threats that large states and emerging states continue to pose threats to the United States. This is not a world in which those -- the potential for major regional conflict has diminished, but I think what we have done in the last decade is we have really ignored the subtext of the security challenge. It has become invisible to us in a systemic way, and as we thought about trying to prosecute tactical operations, we have neglected to think about the second and third order effects that really do undermine the broader context in which we prosecute those tactical gains.

So let me try to unpack that, and I will do this very briefly. We can explore it in Q and A, if you want,

but essentially, the U.S. as top dog sits atop this international security structure and benefits greatly from it, and it has become invisible to us because we created it in our own image, and we have come to take it for granted, and yet in many ways, the diffuse set of actors and trends that are out there that we broadly term variously "al-Qaeda," "globalization," "criminal networks," "disease," have become a threat nexus for the United States when they join, when the actors in particular, the al-Qaedas and the actors as opposed to the external processes join with the potential to harm vital U.S. interests, to those of our allies through weapons of mass destruction. So that is what I call the "threat nexus." It is the chronic piece of nonstate actors and nonstate processes that have the potential to join with destructive capabilities that are potentially harmful to the United States in the same way that a pure competitor could be, and therefore, in my view, it is proper to think about those actors and that threat nexus as one of an insurgency, one of the revolutionaries against the system that the U.S. was until recently the undisputed leader of.

So I see the broader strategic challenge, this

subtext that I mentioned earlier, as being one of stabilization, and that stabilization challenge often will conflict with the challenge that we have in meeting more traditional threats or acute threats where they join with nontraditional actors. So it is not as though you can reject a need for destabilizing while you pursue a stabilization strategy. Nonetheless, I think it is an orientation that is fundamentally different from that, that the U.S. has adopted in the post-9/11 world, and I think we need to return to this notion of minimally and judiciously upsetting the status quo. Our strategic challenge is maintaining the status quo, maintaining the state system, maintaining international commerce, maintaining order, maintaining the regulation of this system that I just argued has become somewhat invisible to us.

So the principles from the field manual that then become relevant to that challenge and that mode of thinking concern population security and well-being, and here is where my earlier caveat come in, but this notion of insecurity and inequity, whether it is evidenced in Hamburg, whether it is evidence in Pushkar, whether it is evidenced in rural Africa, this notion of populations

matter and security of populations mattering I think is inescapable. Military force, the notion of it being counterproductive is obviously relevant to this. If your frame is stability, you are trying to be conservative with a small "c" mode. Your aim is not to be revolutionary and upset it. Military force will have unpredictable, as many in the audience know better than I, effects, and we had best be wary of triggering them.

The whole notion of the indirect approach, the notion of by through and with, of working with other states, working with other regional and international institutions, working with nonstate actors, working with, dare I say, cut-outs, working through everyone else but us, keeping the U.S. profile as low as possible I think is an operating principle that we could usefully apply at the strategic level. In other words, the less visible the U.S. is, the less credit we take for success, the more successful we are likely to be in achieving our objectives.

Another notion from the manual, this idea of a long-term proposition, it is very hard to measure success.

It elides the kind of traditional quantification that you can find in conventional military operations, but instead

of this notion of death through a thousand cuts, I think you have to employ this notion of victory through a thousand small acts of healing. It is a very different construct for thinking about your engagement, and ultimately, when done right, you move away from the kinetic piece, all the way up to the nonkinetic and preventative piece, and the notion of strategic patience and the Achilles' heel that the U.S. has there becomes very important.

The idea of restraint and compromise is another principle that comes from the field manual that, again, is applicable at the strategic level, not just in the operation of your military efforts, but also in the framing of your policy. The very notion that you need to redefine your own visions of what is right, your own vision of success to accommodate variously in the manual, though it is nation government, we could call it the international community and the strategic construct, but accounting for others and being willing to redefine your own narrow interests is absolutely vital for success when you think about taking these principles and putting them in a strategic framework.

Very real values tradeoffs come from that phenomenon, and we shouldn't underplay them, and we need to educate ourselves and gird ourselves to make some very difficult choices and hold our noses sometimes.

Finally, this moderating of the rhetoric, not necessarily a principle articulated in the field manual, but certainly implicit from the way it talks about the importance of communicating, this need to not only downplay domestic expectations about what you will be able to achieve in the world, so as to avoid that gap between high expectations and frustration, that lack of fulfillment of them, whether it is in a counterinsurgency or whether it is in prosecuting a war at the national level, but also to avoid this appearance of crusading and imposing your values abroad, I think is extremely important that the U.S. begin to think about the way it describes its role in the world and its objectives differently, which hopefully will actually have that Kissingerian added value of being true because we have redefined the way we think about our interests.

Though that summation of principal transfer from the manual to strategy ought to raise some alarm bells to

anyone who wears an American foreign policy hat listening in this room, you can very clearly see a huge tension between what I have suggested is required and what is politically expedient in the domestic U.S. context. So perhaps our first goal ought to be simply doing no harm in our choice of war, in the use of overwhelming military power, and in the ineffectiveness of our nation-building.

So I want to take two minutes and talk about impact on the Army. I'm sorry to be cramming so much in here. I am actually deleting a whole section, you will be pleased to know.

Impact on the Army. The basic argument that I make in the field manual introduction is that the Army is filling a vacuum left by political leadership, and it is simply unfair I think to expect the Army or a military institution to do sort of the classic ways-and-means equation when there has not been an adequate articulation of the overarching strategy.

So you have an institution that is grappling with what is essentially an unfunded mandate, which is 3000.05.

You have them struggling with concepts such as building partnership capacity, struggling with the notion of what a

threat is and using broad phrases like "persistent conflict," and struggling with the notion of what it means to be a full-spectrum force when the demands externally for overall USG capabilities far exceed anything that the U.S. itself or the military itself or the U.S. Army alone can begin to provide.

So you have I think a significant problem for institutionalization of the right responses to the global environment, and simply put, it is what do we do. Are COIN and stability operations really important? Are they actually distinct from warfighting? Are they even military? These are virtually existential questions, but from them flow the proper answers to the Army, in particular, its responsibilities and priorities, and it is a tall order. I have thoughts that I will hold on what that might mean.

I think I want to end by saying that when I think back to being in the Pentagon in the 1990's -- well, actually, let me start by stepping back one. The U.S. as a whole, as a nation, tends to swing between extremes. Our foreign policy history is rich with this vacillation between isolationism and being a hyper power in its most

recent valence, and we have today in the context of this hybrid threat, a chance to focus on a middle ground I think and an opportunity to do that because I see either of those extremes as being extremely harmful to U.S. national security.

What I want to suggest is that in the 1990's, there were those who claimed to represent a military perspective and those in the political debate who chafed under the restraints that were allegedly imposed on U.S. foreign policy and the prosecution of security strategy. They characterized U.S. leadership as hesitant to use military power. They worried that there was a premium on international cooperation or dependence on multilateral blessing and concerns that the military was being constrained in terms of its ability to contribute to solutions.

In the last decade, many of these folks have found that they have received exactly what they have asked for. There has rarely been such a readiness to use U.S. military power. There was a great dismissal of foreign policy as social work and an agreement that the military didn't need to wash windows, such that it became

problematic when those proved to be necessary. There was a freedom from multilateral institutions and their normative associates and correlates, and there was a military that gained dominance, bureaucratic dominance and budgetary dominance within the Beltway in a way that was unprecedented.

So now I think many of us are atavistic for the principles that we thought we had once suffered under, and I think the notion of sustaining relationships and institutions going forward, the notion of the primacy of politics and political leadership, both abroad and in Washington, as they are manifest in the field manual and as I have suggested they can be transferred to strategy are back in vogue, and people will have a greater ability to hear them if we can think clearly about threat differentiation and the requirements for institutional change and effective strategy in the 21st century.

Thanks.

LTC NAGL: Thank you, Sarah.

Could I have the slides up, please?

Sarah, as she has in the several years now I have had the privilege to know her, has set me up for success

very well every time, and what I am going to do today is really go from her broader strategic perspective down to focusing, as the title of the talk says, the Army and counterinsurgency, that, of course, I had to Andy Krepinevich whose own work has been so important in my intellectual development.

What I am going to talk about today a little bit is the field manual, why we needed it, what it says, and where we go from here, really my level of analysis being the Army. I am not speaking on behalf of the Army. That is why I am wearing my urban camouflage today, but I am, in fact, up here as an army of one speaking only for myself, and please take my words in that light.

I would also like to clarify my role in writing this book. At the conference that General Petraeus and Sarah co-hosted at Leavenworth in February 2006, General Petraeus described me as the "project's mascot," and I would like to take full credit for that particular role.

I would like to start off, if I can, by looking back a month to the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who spoke at the Association of the United States Army Conference here in town, and it was a bit challenging

to the United States Army at that particular venue. He said, "In the years following Vietnam, the Army relegated unconventional war to the margins of training doctrine and budget, leaving the service unprepared to deal with the operations that followed, the consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today."

Unless someone thinks that the Secretary of Defense has it in for the Army, I would just like to follow up with a citation from a highly respected Army officer, retired, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jack Keane, who said on the Jim Lehrer NewsHour about 18 months ago very similar words. General Keane said, "We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. The truth of the matter is it doesn't have any doctrine. It wasn't educated and trained to deal with an insurgency. After Vietnam, we purged ourselves of everything that dealt with insurgency because it had to deal with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision. We have responsibility," and those last three words certainly resound in my ears, and I feel a personal sense of that responsibility and of the need to make up for lost time and help the Army and the nation

prepare for and fight and win the wars that it is, in fact, fighting today.

I have the great privilege of being a father of a six-year-old. My six-year-old has recently moved into the Power Rangers phase, but up until about a year ago, he was all about Bob the Builder. Those of you who also have young children at home may be familiar with Bob the Builder's wonderful motto, which became an elite motif in my own household, and Bob the Builder's motto, of course, the refrain of the show is "Can we fix it? Yes, we can."

So the good news is that, although we weren't as ready for counterinsurgency as we could have been, organizations can, in fact, adapt and learn, and I am going to draw on the work of Richard Downey, whose doctoral dissertation published as the U.S Army as Learning Institution, describes the process of organizational learning as a process by which an organization uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust norms, doctrine, and procedures, to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future success, essentially to benchmark best practices in order to succeed in the current environment.

Downey essentially took John Boyd's OODA Loop. John Boyd, as I am sure most of you know, was a Korean War fighter pilot who tried to figure out why it was that despite the fact that the F-86's we were flying in Korea against MiG-15's, the MiG-15 a better airplane, we still achieved a remarkable shoot-down ratio of some 10 to 1, and what Boyd hypothesized was that the pilot who can observe what is going on -- if you are talking about fighter planes, you got to put your hands up, right? -- observe what is going on, orient himself in relation to the enemy, decide what he wants to do and act, that is, getting inside his enemy's decision cycle or OODA Loop. The guy who does that faster than his enemy wins nine times out of 10, and Richard Downey took that idea and applied it to organizations.

In this particular case, if there is a change in a situation, in the environment, in what is going on, if an Army, organized, designed, trained, and equipped for conventional combat, finds itself fighting insurgencies, there are going to be individuals who pay attention to what is going on, the sharper knives in the drawer, and in this particular case, two of the sharpest knives were men named

Petraeus and Mattis, both men remarkable commanders in Iraq, as major generals. Petraeus, in command of the 101st in Mosel, asked all of his troops, "What have you done for the people of Iraq today?" Mattis, my boss, in al-Anbar in 2004 made the motto of the 1st Marine Division, "No better friend, no worse enemy, first, do no harm," truly a remarkable situation and playing to some of the things that Sarah talked about when a Marine division commander in combat is using the Hippocratic Oath as part of his division's combat motto.

The Army and the Marine Corps recognized it had in these two major generals something very special and something that understood the way of the war we were fighting, and it put them in the right places. It put Petraeus, after his second Iraq tour, in charge of the Combined Arms Center at Leavenworth, put Mattis in charge of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, and these two newly promoted three-star generals identified the organizational performance gap and tried to come up with a new way of doing business.

They, in fact, were able to, through some fairly extraordinary leadership, in my opinion, bring the

organizations to a sustained consensus that a new way of doing business was, in fact, necessary, and they were then able, if you look at that, to transmit this new way of doing business to publish doctrine, and in December of 2006, Field Manual 3-24, the Marine Corps Warfighting Pub 3-33.5, was, in fact, published, one would expect that new way of doing business then to change the way the organizations acted on the ground, and I would argue that that is, in fact, much of what has happened.

I would not so much say that the book is the driver of action, as the book both benefitted from and improved understanding in the force on how to conduct counterinsurgency, but also accelerated that process of learning, and most importantly, perhaps, General Petraeus had the great opportunity to think through the problem at great depth and to an extraordinary level of detail, and he individually penned and inked every page of the manual more than once, but that allowed this book to be produced, which should then change the way the organization does business if Downey's organizational learning cycle is correct. I think it is a useful way to look at that process.

The single most important page in the book is

actually a flagrant and shameless theft from a now-Lieutenant General Corelli's Military Review article of 2005, May-June 2005, as I recall, and this is that diagram.

I would like to talk you through it, if I can, quickly because this is really the heart of counterinsurgency, as described in 3-24.

So, in any counterinsurgency campaign, you are going to be dealing with a relatively small number of insurgents, and Con Crane, who was the lead editor of the book, came up with the phrase "mosaic war" to describe the fact that counterinsurgency can be different literally in every block of the same city.

In the particular piece of the mosaic that I am most familiar with, and that is the fight in al-Anbar in 2004, I was responsible for a sector of about 60,000 people centered on the town of Khaldia, and some of you have probably been in the neighborhood of Khaldia. It is between the also lovely, slightly larger towns of Ramadi and Fallujah. So it was a pretty good neighborhood in 2004. I actually bought some property there, and my wife and I are hoping to retire there in a few years.

The 60,000 people in that sector, of those

60,000, as near as we could tell, about one-half of 1 percent, about 300 people, were, in fact, actively trying to kill us. Right about one-half of 1 percent were the only insurgents we actually faced.

To confront them, we had a tank battalion task force of about 800, which really shouldn't be a fair fight.

It shouldn't have caused us too many problems, except for the fact that in that, Mau's very famous accurate phrase, "Those 300 people were swimming in the sea of the people."

In al-Anbar in 2004, this diagram simply doesn't do the environment on the ground justice. In fact, the group of people who were neutral or passive or who frankly actively supported the insurgency probably went down to about there; the number of people who physically supported the government or coalition, perhaps the thickness of my laser pointer.

In order to win that kind of war, in order to create security and stability in that environment, you cannot kill or capture your way to success. Whatever caused those insurgents to emerge from the sea of the people will simply cause, literally, their brothers to rise up and replace them and probably bring some of their

friends along.

So, to defeat that kind of insurgency, what you have to do, again in Mau's phrase, is "drain the swamp"; that is decrease the number of people who support the ends of the insurgency, and the way to do that is by increasing the number who support the government or the coalition, and in order to do that, General Corelli and then in turn the drafters of 3-24 came up with multiple, what we called, logical lines of operation, and these are not exhaustive or exclusive, but they are certainly among the most important, so combat operations certainly to kill or capture identified insurgents, the part of the fight I am engaged in now, train and employ host nation security forces, provide a central services to the population, water, electricity, opportunities for academic growth, interestingly one of General Petraeus' primary efforts on Mosel in 2003, 2004, creating a government that can meet the needs of all of the people, not something we have been able to succeed with at the national level, but increasingly something we are showing progress with at the local and provincial levels, and economic development.

At the time we were fighting in 2004, we

estimated unemployment in al-Anbar in excess of 70 percent, and in an environment in which there is lots of money, weapons readily available, porous borders, and ideological cause, and 70-percent unemployment, you simply are not going to be able to be able to defeat an insurgency under those conditions, so economic development also important. All of those tied together in the big arrow through a comprehensive information operations campaign, and this is very much the strategy that General Petraeus I think had followed in Iraq since he arrived there. He benefitted from an organizational learning process from developments on the ground on the enemy situation, but also from a more capable force for counterinsurgency that had learned how to conduct these kind of operations and, knock on wood, with some degree of success thus far and some of that a function of some of the people here in this room today.

So we have now the best counterinsurgency doctrine the Army has had in 20 years. I am, of course, confident in making that statement because it is the only counterinsurgency doctrine we have had in 20 years, but as Sarah mentioned, doctrine is just the first step in how the Army organizes itself for the things that it is supposed to

do, and she mentioned the dot-mil-PF, a wonderful acronym, which is one of the ways the Army thinks about itself.

A doctrine explains how the Army thinks about the conflict environment and how the Army thinks about its role in that environment. So doctrine should be the driver, the engine that pushes the rest of the Army in the right direction to make it more capable for the security environment in which it finds itself.

Following along with the acronym organization, I have actually recommended that the Army create what I call an Army Advisor Corps in order to do the mission that I am involved with right now, this mission of training transition teams who embed with Iraqi and Afghan security forces, in order to provide the analogy I like to use, the reinforcing rods, the steel reinforcing rods around which the concrete can harden, and the Center here was kind enough to publish that paper.

Training, in the AUSA speech, Secretary of Defense Gates mentioned that the Army has made remarkable strikes in training, and this, I think other than doctrine, is the place we have most successfully adapted to the demands of the kinds of war we are fighting today,

remarkable changes in the National Training Center, the creation of entire Iraqi and Afghan villages populated by native language speakers, creating a very real environment.

In fact, we have done some of that as well as Fort Riley in order to provide a better environment in which to train the combat advisors. We are preparing for combat materiel, the MRAP, the Mind Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, which we are now procuring, a purpose-designed, wheeled, fighting vehicle, designed for this kind of war, development, some big changes, great progress under now-retired Brigadier General Jim Warner in particular at the command in General Staff College, refocusing that institution, that key institution of higher learning in the Army on counterinsurgency and this kind of war, personnel, some move toward creating more of the civil affairs officers, the linguists, the military police who are really the front lines of success in this kind of war.

If you think about the previous slide and the tasks on that slide, not all of them, perhaps most of them not military tasks as we think of them, but tasks given the conflict environments we find ourselves in, in Iraq and Afghanistan, tasks that are by default going to fall to the

military at least until we can develop additional capacity and capability in the civilian organizations of the U.S. Government, and I will talk more to that in a second, and finally, facilities I actually think that far more important than bricks and mortar in this kind of environment is changes in mind-set, and those are engendered by the doctrine.

And of course, the problem goes bigger than the Army. It extends throughout the Department of Defense. I would just like to highlight two statements that seem to indicate that the Department of Defense agrees with the need for continuous change and reassessment to defeat the highly adaptive adversaries who are fighting. Sarah mentioned DOD 3000.05, signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England on November 28th of 2005, a very, very important, very powerful statement, stability operations are a core U.S. military mission, given priority comparable to combat operations. That is a big statement, explicitly addressed across all activities including -- and we go through the dot-mil-PF.

So, obviously, as all of you in this room know, if OSD directs something, the services snap right do it. I

found it very interesting that General Lance Smith, just before stepping down as Joint Forces Command Commander last month, said that the danger is that we get so focused on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare that we are not prepared for a different kind of war. I would say that that is not the danger, but a danger. Another danger is that we do not adapt far enough, fast enough, to defeat today's adaptive adversaries.

The question becomes finding the right point on that balance. I do not believe -- I am more concerned that we have not adapted far enough, fast enough, than we have adapted too far or too fast.

So there is, I would argue at this point, on consensus on exactly where we need to go. The Army has done a great deal of adaptation and has also done some permanent adaption, which I would define as learning. Some of those indications are the doctrinal innovation Sarah talked about in FM 3-24. We have done some changes in organization. My own unit, a tank brigade, has been stood down from that mission in order to train these transition teams. Obviously, the transition teams the Army has created as combat advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan, a huge

change in the Army's organization to this point, not a permanent change in the Army's force structure, and I discussed some of the other changes that have happened, but there is still I think much learning to be done, both in the Department of Defense and in the other agencies of the U.S. Government, and I would like to highlight the fact that David Kilcullen, who is in the room, is leading a State Department-led effort to create a similar sort of book or certainly a book inspired by some of the principles in here. I think it is not too strong to say that, and Dave is actually leading that effort this week here in this town.

So the other agencies of the U.S. Government, Galula said counterinsurgency is 80-percent nonmilitary and only 20 percent military. The other 80 percent also have to do a great deal of adaption and learning in order for the nation to succeed in the conflict environment in which we find ourselves, and Dave is one of the people leading that effort, and I applaud him for that.

I will end, if I can, with Secretary of Defense, again from AUSA. The Secretary said, "It is hard to conceive of any country challenging the U.S. directly on

the ground, at least for some years to come. Instead, we can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for sometime."

In fact, I would go so far as to argue that in the 20th century, the primary challenge of international relations was states that are too strong. In the 21st century, it may well be that the primary challenge to power, is to establish power, is states that are too weak, and if that is, in fact, the case, we need a very different military and a very different national security establishment to cope with that in reality, and FM 3-24, a "radical field manual," in Sarah's words, a step in that direction, but only the first step.

[Technical difficulties.]

QUESTIONER: [In progress] -- at the end of your presentation.

QUESTIONER: I know, and I know in chapter, paragraph 1-4 in the manual, it talks about the armed services cannot succeed in COIN by itself.

Many a year ago, there was a hearing on Capitol Hill with the late General Wayne Downing, former U.S. SOCOM Commander, Max Boot, and Mike Vickers, who at that time was

not the ASD SO/LIC, and the chairman of the subcommittee, Adam Smith, specifically asked the question about what do we need in the future, and General Downing paused and said, "The military cannot win the long war by itself, but it can lose it," and then he went through giving a set of examples about military officers, particularly in SOF, doing tasks over there that should be done by Treasury, that should be done by Agriculture, and was asked why aren't they doing it, and he said, "Well, they say they are not funded for it, it is not their job, or the military is already doing it."

So, in terms of where will you see the other government agencies going, I know that SOCOM now has got 100 OGA personnel embedded down at SOCOM to support that. General Brown and now Admiral Olson is trying to put 100 people up here in the other government agencies.

We saw recently, two weeks ago, the confrontation in the State Department where I guess there were State Department officers that said, "I'm not going to go to Iraq." Do we need a new national security strategy that encompasses all of the government agencies?

MS. FLOURNOY: Sarah?

DR. SEWALL: Sure. Yeah, that was sort of my point.

In September's Foreign Service Journal, I have a piece about the national security strategy argument that lay sit out in a little more flesh than I am able to do today, but I think your question is very well taken.

I think the phenomenon that I was trying to write about that underlies the reluctance of foreign service officers to go to Iraq transcends the problem of Iraq and bears directly on this question of national security strategy.

If we don't conceive of the prosecution of conflict as being a whole-of-government problem, there is no reason to develop a whole-of-government capacity. You can coordinate all you want, but if you don't have any capacity to coordinate, it doesn't matter very much, and the larger unanswered questions are strategic questions.

In other words, we have two distinct problems vis-a-vis civilian capacity. One is that we have not as a nation said it was important to develop this capacity. We tried in the 1990's, and Congress was the main opponent then. In the most recent decade or whatever, the

administration has not put its money where its mouth is on that form, thus my comment about unfunded mandate, but the underlying question has to do with the purposes of this capability.

If you lack, as John was saying, a consensus about America's role in the world and its priorities in terms of using military and nonmilitary capacity, it should not be surprising that it is difficult to gain consensus about building that capacity.

If the capacity is going to be applied for very controversial purposes, you will undermine your ability to create it.

So the reality is that we have an enduring chronic problem in the really post-Vietnam era and some could argue post-World War II era, that civilian capacity.

We had more nonmilitary capacity devoted to the cold war than we do devoted to what we have called an ideological struggle today. So we need capabilities similar to those that we used to have, like the U.S. Information Agency. We need an agency for international development that doesn't simply let contracts, but that actually has an operational mode. We have lost that operational art, in large part,

due to nonmilitary pieces of the government.

In part, the military has done its job too well, and we have been able to believe that we didn't need these other capacities, but the issue of the purposes to which this capacity will be put is irrelevant because we don't have consensus at the strategic level. If you don't have consensus at the strategic level, not only will you not have congressional support via budgeting, you won't have the support of the individual people that you ultimately need.

The new pieces that we need that are very different I think will not be found in reforming the State Department. I do think we need to think about an expeditionary corps of what I call the "Powell mil hybrid," who can go and rapidly deploy and with a consciousness that transcends the bucket of "I am a civilian," "I am a military," think about solving these problems.

I think those are luxuries we can -- it is certainly worth developing those concepts now, but until, again, we get this broader strategic consensus, I am afraid that the issue of capacity building will be a secondary problem.

LTC NAGL: I associate myself completely with those remarks.

One of the things I have said, the ways I put it, is that we are currently building an Army that is more like the State Department, but we also need to build a State Department and other agencies of the U.S. Government that are more like the Army.

Playing to Sarah's comment, the U.S. Agency for International Development, absolutely vital to success in the long war. It currently has 3,000 personnel, U.S. Government personnel. As I understand it, there were 15,000 USAID just in Vietnam at one time during the late 1960's. So the capacity question absolutely matters, and I would be remiss if I didn't make a point of arguing every time I get before a microphone, the single agency we most need to win the long war is the U.S. Information Agency to win the war of ideas.

The USIA, in my opinion, played a huge role in winning the cold war which was primarily an economic war, secondarily a military war, and only third, an ideological war. The war we are fighting today is primarily an ideological war. Success in that war depends on winning

the war of ideas. The field manual says that information operations tend to be decisive in counterinsurgency campaigns. That is true. Inside one country, it is also true on the broader, what Kilcullen calls the "global counterinsurgency campaign." We have got to do a better job with the war of ideas.

MS. FLOURNOY: Just a footnote before we take the next question. Two of the tasks that the Center, CNAS, has set for ourselves over the next year, one is to try to articulate the basis for a new national security strategy, that conceptual framework that Sarah was talking about, and second to do a very detailed study looking at civilian capacity, why is it needed, what are the different models for building it, deploying it, utilizing it, in which what makes the most sense, to sort of have ready for the new administration coming in, some notion of the way forward if the decision was made that building additional and more operational civilian capacity was necessary, so unpaid advertising finished.

Yes, Curt.

QUESTIONER: Yes. Thank you both very much. Really fascinating presentations.

Can I ask you, John, in particular, but also if you could comment on this, Sarah -- I think you presented a highly coherent view about how change is beginning to happen inside the Army, but let me just posit another possibility in which rather than thinking about this as sort of a very efficient top-down change, that this is actually much more like an institutional battle that is akin to the battle that is being fought out inside in Iraq and elsewhere.

So I would be curious if you could give me a sense about how the institutional battle is going. I think honest putting up of the comments from JFCOM sort of give us a sense that there are going to be powerful institutional actors that are going to say, "Not so fast. We clearly don't like to do this. This is not an accident that we have arrived in this situation," and there will be powerful profound forces that will say, "Either we are not going to do this, or we are not going to do it again, and we will lie and wait and then try to ambush this as you go forward."

So give us a sense how the second battle is going institutionally that you described. Thanks.

MS. FLOURNOY: John?

LTC NAGL: Thanks, Curt.

My doctoral dissertation looked at the case of the British Army counterinsurgency adaptation in Malaya and American Army counterinsurgency in Vietnam, and I argue that the organizational culture of the United States Army, which I think was perhaps best described by Russ Weigley in the "American Way of War," a focus on decisive battles, a concept of defeat in the enemy army in the field is the key to military success. That was the Army's boutonniere, and the strength of that idea overcame numerous attempts at real organizational change in the United States Army during Vietnam.

Even Creighton Abrams, who understood counterinsurgency very well, was unable to overcome that organizational culture in time, in the amount of time that the American people gave the administration to prosecute the war in Vietnam.

It is very much an open -- the organizational culture of the Army, I would argue, not only remains the same as it did then, but in reaction to America's lack of success in Vietnam, and the publication of Harry Summer's

"On Strategy" is probably the best illustration of this, the Army's focus on decisive battle, the Powell doctrine that Sarah started by mentioning became even more ingrained in the Army's concept of itself, and the fight I participated in as a young first lieutenant in Operation Desert Storm, very much the Army's idea of how wars should be fought.

One of the most memorable comments I remember from what is known as the "Blue Bedroom" out at Fort Leavenworth when I was out there at the Command and General Staff College, then retired-General Barry McCaffrey spoke to my Command and General Staff College said, and General McCaffrey said -- and I am not going to imitate him because I just can't do him justice, but McCaffrey said, "I fear the majors of Desert Storm," because McCaffrey understood that your brain, of course, freezes when you are 35, and you never get a new thought in it. The majors of Desert Storm -- and I am past that phase now, obviously. So I am completely locked in stone. The folks who fought as majors in Desert Storm who would grow up to lead the Army and, in fact, leading the Army today, had a vision of what warfare was, and it was Desert Storm, a war fought almost on a

billiard table, on a battlefield devoid of civilians.

In fact, I would argue that British General Rupert Smith's book, "The Utility of Force," uses the phrase "war amongst the peoples," and the future of warfare is war amongst the people, but getting that idea through the entire national security establishment and the scale and scope of the change required, which Sarah has dealt with very well I think, is going to be a generational problem, the work of a generation. So it will take the majors of Operation Iraqi Freedom perhaps to ascend to the highest levels of Army leadership and national leadership for that change to be fully institutionalized.

MS. FLOURNOY: A question here. Sir? Can you wait for the microphone, please? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: My name is Russell Vitushak [ph], I work at Scribe Strategies and Advisors, a defense consulting firm.

I found this conversation very interesting because I serve with the State Department in Iraq as a temporary Federal hire, a 3161. I worked the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office for about nine months, and I am not surprised that the State Department has trouble

getting people to go to Iraq because, as a civilian who has been there and done that, there is little reward, little respect, and little of anything given to the people who do that.

Many young people, like myself, volunteered there, held their positions, came home to -- were home within 12 hours, told to go look for a job on the Internet, given no post traumatic stress disorder counsel, basically thrown under the rug.

So the word is out in the civilian community that going to Iraq doesn't help you career. It is actually like almost a negative, and it could be a big problem.

So my question is what is DoD, what is DOS, what are people doing to change the attitude on how to respect, reward these people? Because that is why nobody wants to go anymore, because there's plenty of stories, people like me, like you go and you come back, and, you know, goodbye.

Are you aware of any institutional change that is going to make people or civilians want to go there, thinking that it is going to help them out? Because the civilian sector is different than military, you know. People go looking for advancement. I didn't, but that's sort of the situation.

So that's my question.

DR. SEWALL: I'm glad you found a job.

[Laughter.]

DR. SEWALL: I think you are returning us to this issue of capacity. So let me try to take it into two different bites.

One, you were already there. So you had passed the threshold of whether you wanted to do this. I think that is a separate threshold for many people.

I think there is a demographic challenge also where I think you will find people who are younger and people who are older who feel free, and it is hard to say this in the context of a room full of uniforms, but free and able to leave their dependents, to go because this is not what they signed up for. In a lot of ways, this is like talking to the UN about changing a mandate while the operation is underway. Their career paths are very different from what they envision.

So your point about how do you reward those people, I don't think our existing structure can reward them. That is why I am actually pessimistic about the ability of the State Department to meet the current

expeditionary needs that we have, but I want to return to that question.

So I think we need the equivalent of a reserve, a civilian reserve component that tries to take people who have had experiences in the field, and they may not be simply like you who signed up for Iraq. They may be people who work for a Mercy Corps, and that is a bit verboten to say because you get into this debate between the civilian and military space and the humanitarian space more particularly, but there is a real match of skills that goes across the spectrum of idealism that could be vital and really energize the ability of the U.S. to do this kind of hybrid work overseas.

Having said that, I think it is really important for us to recognize -- and this is partly back to Curt's question about the Army and institutional change. This is a really challenging problem, and even if we adapt as quickly as we possibly can, even if we are able to get a strategic consensus about the importance of this problem, even if we are able, therefore, to think in terms of a national security budget as opposed to an 050 and a 150 account and actually have fungibility across the spectrum,

be responsive and vigilant, do all that we want to do, we the USG are a drop in the bucket for the problem that is out there, and whether you conceive of that problem -- this is why this issue of threat categorization and trying to take COIN and put it into operational baskets where you have got different models and you understand where your comparative advantage is and you understand where your vulnerabilities are and you understand what other people can pick, this challenge, nonmilitary pieces can pick up this challenge, I think there is a lot of work on the preventative side, particularly that may actually be dangerous enough, and AID or the State Department, as it is currently configured, can't take it on.

You need a different capability to do that. It may not be a military capability, but all of this stuff is just the beginning. So the by, with, and through, or the through, with, and by, whatever you want to call it, about finding other partners in other regional institutions, in national institutions, institutions we have yet to dream of, I personally would really like to see a Muslim development corps in which the international community provides money to an extant agency that does Peace Corps

work throughout the Muslim world, where we are not doing it, and we are supporting it and we are saying that is important, but it doesn't have our fingerprints and our control.

Those are the kinds of leveraged opportunities that we need to think about because we cannot, as expert as we may become, even if we recognize that we are not there yet -- we cannot do all that needs to be done out there. It is a limitless pool. So we have to prioritize, and we have to find partners.

I wouldn't want these conversations because we are all seized with the challenge, and we all want to fix the challenge. You know, nation of engineers, let's find the engineering solution. Bob the Builder, we can do this.

Right? But the reality is that this is really big, and so we need to be thinking differently and broader than just the USG.

So I think in some ways, the biggest cognitive piece that has to change is not so much how we think about our own roles, even though that is enormous, as John has just laid out. I think it is how we return to thinking about our role in a larger system, our role in a larger

community of persons with similar interests, and our role in trying to make a collective change.

LTC NAGL: Just very quickly, I think the Navy has done a remarkable job with its thousand-ship Navy idea, of creating a construct, a framework that is very much in keeping with what Sarah just said, and I think that that sort of idea, I would argue that the Army's increased focus on advisory efforts does the same sort of thing, the strategic leverage to empower our friends and our allies around the globe to take actions in accordance with America's long-term strategic interest, and we need to think of similar ways to do that on the civilian side as well, but the scale and scope of change required on the civilian side is perhaps even greater than that required on the military side, and that is why Dave Kilcullen has his work cut out for him. It is a good thing he has got broad soldiers.

MS. FLOURNOY: Jim?

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much to both of you. Wonderful presentation.

MS. FLOURNOY: Jim, do you want to tell us who you are? I know who you are.

QUESTIONER: I am Jim Schear, former colleague of some folks here, and I am at the National Defense University.

Could I raise two issues which I sort of personally feel are Achilles' heels here in any discussion of counterinsurgency? One, the need for accurate human intelligence for the problem of targeting kill-and-capture operations.

A colleague of mine came back from command in Eastern Afghanistan complaining about SOF, saying they have wonderful intel, but bad situational awareness, which is an interesting contrast of something that I thought was sort of the same thing.

Anyway, intel as a piece, and also the skunk at the garden party, detainee operations, how do we think about those, clearly important, clearly necessary in any population-centered operation, but with huge downside potentials, not least from the strategic communications standpoint, so two difficult issues.

Thank you.

MS. FLOURNOY: John?

LTC NAGL: Two great, very important questions,

Jim.

The question of intelligence, absolutely right. I have previously said that when I deployed, I deployed in late 2003. September of 2003, we built around a tank battalion, our task force, and the tank battalion has an intelligence staff authorized of five and 400 or so trigger-pullers in my task force of 800. I almost would have preferred the ratios reversed.

I would have been better off with 400 intel officers and four trigger-pullers. That is an exaggeration, of course, but this question of deriving accurate, actionable intelligence is absolutely the key to the military component of counterinsurgency, and it is not just a military problem.

In fact, some of the best intelligence we derived was from humanitarian assistance projects and through building relationships that ultimately bore fruit in intelligence. So I have said you win these wars by drinking tea, and you never know how many cups of tea you have to drink in order to reach that critical barrier of trust in which you are suddenly led into the circle, and one piece of information can be the key that unlocks

Rubik's Cube for you and everything snaps into place.

We had that happen several times. So I absolutely agree, and I would actually like to see interagency teams with reach-back all the way down at the battalion level, and including, not least, intelligence capability all the way down at that level, and Paul Yingling and I have actually written a piece that we published a couple -- 18 months ago now in Armed Forces Journal that argues for that, among other changes to our organization, to better organize ourselves for the kind of wars we are actually fighting.

The detainee ops question, I am very proud to say that the Army has lead in Department of Defense for that. The Army's interrogation field manual is very clear, and it is absolutely essential in winning the long war that the United States remain true to its long and proud legacy of respect for human rights, and that absolutely matters, and we have to be vigilant at all times to ensure that we fight not just with courage, but also with honor.

MS. FLOURNOY: Yes, sir.

QUESTIONER: Jay Parker, Georgetown University,
[inaudible].

I would like to kind of reinforce -- I can hold it. Thank you. Okay.

I would like to --

MS. FLOURNOY: We never give up the microphone.

LTC NAGL: You are looking very feeble, Jay.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I worked at this.

I would like to kind of reinforce some of Sarah's pessimism here.

John, you have talked an awful lot about and written a lot and I know thought a lot about this problem of making adaptation and learning a permanent part of institutions, but as we all know, that is dependent on the individuals leading the institutions.

What really concerns me and others is that as you go through the list of those individuals who you would hope would be taking this kind of knowledge and this kind of attitude into senior leadership in the military and, to a certain extent, those people who had the same experience in AID and the State Department who saw their skills being contracted out, leaving those institutions, the list -- it is anecdotal, but the numbers are depressing of those individuals who have these skills, who have these talents,

who have expressed, as you have, these concerns, who are leaving the military at 10 years or leaving the military at 20 years before they move into senior positions of leadership, or if they stay, moving into functional areas like 59, the strategy field, that can continue to give advice, but are not going to be the ones making the decision.

The pattern that seems to be at work here is that those individuals who are not only innovators, but are flexible and adaptive enough to welcome innovators and future generations are not going to be around in 10 or 15 years, and that we are going to be left with the majors of Desert Storm or we are going to be left with the majors who drew the wrong lessons from this.

And on that same note, I would be curious, Michele, to know if there are elements of the Center's agenda in thinking about national security that you may be looking at in terms of both educating and developing and retaining people who can take the kind of steps that John and Sarah have talked about.

Thank you.

MS. FLOURNOY: Just on that first point, a lot of

what we are looking at is the incentive structure, how do you recruit a different kind of person, how do you actually give them professional development opportunities to make them want to stay, how do you actually reward them, whether it is through early promotion or additional retirement benefits, but the incentive structure is backwards right now across the board. So we are swimming upstream.

I think one of the things that we have seen before is a simple change like the change of the incentive structure in Goldwater-Nichols, how profoundly that changed the views of joint experience within the military. We need something comparable to be rewarding rather than pushing the kinds of people that you are talking about. That ideally should happen from an executive branch and internal military point of view because legislation is a very blunt instrument, but if necessary, you can take the last resort of legislating a change like that.

John, do you want to comment?

LTC NAGL: I associate myself with all of those remarks.

The personnel systems of the U.S. military were designed for a very different time when military service --

when people didn't live as long, when military service tended to be more physically demanding. The 1500-horsepower horses I ride, breaking track is hard, but it is nothing compared to the physical demands of taking care of actual horses on the hoof.

So that the cold war personnel systems I think really do need a lot of adaptation to meet the realities of the current environment, and something the military could, in fact, consider would be lateral entry, folks getting out of the military for a number of years and then perhaps being let back in. That idea, I assume, results in the collective gasp among the folks in uniform in the room, but in fact, I would argue that if the Secretary of Defense is right and these are the kind of conflicts we are going to be fighting for the foreseeable future and if General Corelli's diagram is right and the skills set we need to win these wars is at least as much civilian as it is military and if information operations is the decisive part of that war, then conceivably some of the folks we need to bring into lead the military have a skills set that you simply can't develop in the active-duty military.

So that in World War II, of course, we

commissioned and, in fact, made general officers of people with public affairs backgrounds, people with movie backgrounds, and what a wonderful skills set. The United States leads the world in the propagation of ideas, to bring some of those people into government service in some interesting and innovative ways, but this question of finding the talent we need and encouraging the adaptive risk-taking I think we need in a time of rapid strategic change as we are in today -- and we really are I think in a strategic inflection point, not just in our nation's history, but in the history of the world.

The Tofflers, Heidi and Alvin Toffler, suggests there have only been three revolutions in human history, the agricultural, the industrial, and the information, and we are in the -- still the Model T Ford days I think of the information revolution. If they are correct, and I think they are, then societies will change, and thus, warfare will change just as dramatically during this revolution, but probably in a faster period of time than human interactions, including warfare did during the industrial revolution. And we had enormous problems coming to terms with industrial age warfare. Remember the slaughters of

the U.S. Civil War all the way through the first World War.

I hope that it will not take that degree of pain and suffering to get us to come to terms with warfare and the information age that we are fighting today and warfare among the populations and for the support of the populations as we are fighting today, and I think we will continue to fight for the foreseeable future.

MS. FLOURNOY: Okay. Yes, sir. Right here.

QUESTIONER: John, I am assuming that in your duties, you have seen both active component, reserve component, Department of Defense forces flow through, planning and preparation, execution of mission, counterinsurgencies, to build the operations, being members of military transition teams, being parts of provincial reconstruction teams, these relatively recent tools.

My question would be, from that experience, are you seeing any performance strengths, specific challenges, active component and reserve component? Are there any indicators of roles and missions, criteria for employment from the active/reserve component force mix that you are seeing?

LTC NAGL: Sir, a great question, and very much

in keeping, a follow-on to Jay's question about the personnel systems and adapting the personnel systems to the wars we are fighting today, the guard and reserve forces were intended to be a strategic reserve, of course, to be called upon only in times of national emergency, and the thought was of a World War II sort of conflict.

In fact, we have gone to a very different model in which we are calling on the reserves much more often, and as you mentioned, including very heavy reliance on the National Guard for transition teams, mostly sent to Afghanistan, which is where I am most familiar with, and we see, with the folks coming through, differing levels of ability based in large part on differing levels of training prior to their arrival at Fort Riley where we train them for a total of about 75 days prior to their deployment.

So the teams that have been sourced by States, trained together in their homestates prior to deployment, tend to do very, very well, and it pains me to say this. Some of the best teams I have seen, better than the active-duty teams, have been the National Guard teams who have had that advantage of building teams and building on the strengths of coming from one State and long-term

relationships there. Others who have not had those advantages have not been as successful.

In general, the folks from the guard bring some of those, in a lot of cases, some of those civilian experiences that I talked about as being necessary for success in a counterinsurgency campaign, but we are not doing as good a job as we should of tracking that civilian skills set. In a lot of cases, it is serendipity that the right guy ends up in the right place. Sometimes he has to do a lot of wiggling to put himself in the right place.

Just this last week, I taught a counterinsurgency class to a team that had a major, a National Guard major out of New York who works in the financial service industry, took a well-over-a-90-percent pay cut to come on active duty, and he is currently slated to go over to Afghanistan in order to advise a Kandak and Afghan battalion when, in fact, he has the skills set to run the Afghan economy.

We are not doing a good job of understanding the civilian skills set and of putting -- the guard and the reserve forces is one of the great advantages they bring -- and applying that intelligently to the varying problems

that we face. That is one of the places where I think we could really go a long way.

MS. FLOURNOY: If I could just underscore those point from personal experience, this is a very simple, but powerful fix. There are a couple of services whose personnel systems, the Marine Corps and the Navy, track the civilian occupations of their reservists.

So, for Afghanistan, my husband was mobilized as a Naval reservist not because of his Navy position, but because of his civilian job at IBM. He was brought in to overhaul the information fusion system for NCIS as a reservist.

Army doesn't do that yet. It is a very subtle, but critical fix to the personnel management system to be able to reach in and touch people because of their civilian expertise, and we would overnight, if we were able to do that, gain access to a whole lot of talent and a whole lot of relevant skills sets if we were able to do that, and it is a hard fix, but it is also a doable fix, with a little bit of investment in IT management systems.

Yes. Is that Esther? I can't see in the light.

QUESTIONER: Hello. Thank you to the panel.

Esther Brimmer, Center for TransAtlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, SAIS. I very much appreciate the comments of the panel.

I wanted to just go back to the original question about defending the international system, and particularly, how do we translate some of these themes about the evolving U.S. approach to counterinsurgency when we are working with our allies, our permanent allies; for example, particularly in the NATO context, so that since they are often on the battlefield with us, whether physically or on the battlefield of ideas of defending liberal democracy within the system? So how do we actually practically translate this to make sure they are part of that conversation, too?

MS. FLOURNOY: Sarah?

DR. SEWALL: Well, first of all, we have to admit that we don't do everything right, and that is sometimes easier at the working level than it is at the highest levels of government.

I know that State has -- that DoD and State have been working together to make counterinsurgency part of a structured NATO conversation, and of course, it is easier there because NATO is undertaking a variety of

counterinsurgency missions.

At the same time, I think some of the tensions that you see in the field in Afghanistan speak to Lacuna or miscommunication among allies about terminology, about precepts, about operating assumptions, about preparedness of those who participate in those operations.

So I believe that we have a long way to go to develop a vernacular that actually works even in the NATO context with regard to counterinsurgency, and I think the minute you walk outside of those decades of history of translation and developing common operating procedures, you have an even bigger challenge.

So that is one piece of the answer to your question, Esther. I think we have to, A, recognize that we don't have the solution to sell, that we actually do have questions and practice to bring to the conversation, and to find a way to create a common understanding, and I think that is sometimes hard particularly in the NATO context, the nation that has led that alliance and basically trained that alliance throughout its history.

I don't think we are in a position to be training on COIN. I don't think we have the corner on that market.

So that is one piece of it.

I think the second piece of it is that some of the underlying tensions within just the NATO, just frame that, just the NATO conversation, really do relate to the broader questions that I sound like a broken record on which have to do with the primacy of force, which have to do with the insistence upon outcomes that you control, which have to do with the way you think about adapting your operations to local structures, governance values on the ground.

We had a lot of similar tensions in the context of peace operations within the NATO alliance in the 1990's.

We never got them fully resolved. We shouldn't be surprised as when you push the bubble, they are resurfacing in a COIN context. The civility operations COIN counter-terrorism continuum is very slippery, and it is a mosaic within itself, and we tend to not want to deal with the complexities that trying to unpack that would entail, but because we don't have a vernacular, we don't have clarity within our own frame, we, therefore, don't have a common frame for understanding how and where you have moved from stability operations to counterinsurgency, to

counter-terrorism. It is a very muddled conversation.

So we need to get our clarity within our own minds before we can structure a combined conversation, if you will, about counterinsurgency, but I do think it is critically important, and I think we have a lot to learn from those who do things very, very differently, and I think adapting to what they can tell us is very much related to this notion of redefining your interests in a slightly different way than I was talking about in terms of the goals of your security strategy.

So I think there is enormous benefit for us to be a listening partner in that conversation.

LTC NAGL: And a little bit of a glass half full on that, the British Army is redoing its counterinsurgency doctrine under the leadership of Colonel Alex Alderson, a friend of many in this room, and retired Brigadier Gavin Bulloch, and they are drawing upon the work in this book and carrying it forward, I think. Also, interestingly, the French invited some of the American team that put this book together, the British team, and some Germans who are similarly working on counterinsurgency doctrines as sort of a nascent non-U.S.-led, actually French-led effort perhaps

leading to some idea of a common complex operations doctrine, and Sarah talks to some of the sensitivity, and the COIN counterinsurgency can be a four-letter word. It is abbreviated "COIN" in that case, I guess, but there are efforts ongoing, not all U.S.-led, and I think that is enormously positive, and it speaks to some of the challenges I think that both you and Sarah mentioned in the Afghanistan context in which we have 37 different countries cooperating together in an enormously difficult and dangerous and complicated environment, and a common conceptual understanding of the problem I think is essential to success in this long war.

MS. FLOURNOY: Well, this has been a very rich discussion, and I apologize that we have run out of time. If some of you have burning questions, I am sure that Sarah and John might be available outside. They will also be available to sign books, if anybody would like the rare John Hancocks of these two wonderful people, but please join me in thanking them for a very provocative discussion.

[Applause.]

MS. FLOURNOY: I would also thank all of you for your contributions, very, very good, and I would encourage

you to keep your eyes open for announcements of future events. This is a conversation. We have touched on many topics that we want to come back to and feature CNAS conversations and events. So I hope you will join us for those as well. Thank you.

[End of Panel Discussion.]

- - -